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IMAGINING OTHERS
HEIDI L. MAIBOM
CARLETON UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT
It is often argued that the ability to imagine what others think and feel is central to moral func-
tioning. In this paper, I consider to what extent this is true. I argue that neither the ability to
think of others as having representational mental states, nor the ability to imagine being in their
position, is necessary for moral understanding or moral motivation. I go on to argue that the
area in which thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings appears to play the largest role is
that of supererogatory actions. Being able to get on well with others seems to be importantly
predicated on our ability to think about their thoughts and feelings and being able to take up
their perspective. However, when it comes to grosser moral norms and restrictions, such as harm
norms, there is little reason to think that thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings plays a
central role in understanding such norms or being motivated by them.
RÉSUMÉ
Il est souvent argué que la capacité d’imaginer ce que les autres pensent et ressentent est au
cœur du fonctionnement moral. Dans cet article, j’examinerai l’étendue de cette affirmation. Je
soutiendrai que, ni la capacité de penser autrui comme possédant des états mentaux représen-
tatifs, ni la capacité de s’imaginer dans leur position, ne sont nécessaires pour la compréhension
morale ou pour la motivation morale. Je soutiendrai également que réfléchir aux pensées et aux
sentiments des autres semble jouer un rôle plus important dans le domaine des actes suréroga-
toires. Être capable de bien s‘entendre avec les autres paraît découler, d’une manière importante,
de notre capacité à penser leurs pensées et leurs sentiments et à adopter leur point de vue.
Toutefois, quand il s’agit de normes morales et de restrictions moins précises, comme le sont les
normes relié au tort moral, il y a peu de raisons de penser que réfléchir aux pensées des autres
et à leurs sentiments jouent un rôle central dans la compréhension de ces normes ainsi que dans
la motivation découlant de ces normes.
It is tempting to think that fundamental to good moral function-
ing is the ability to imagine what others think and feel, or to be able
to take up their perspective. Parents often encourage their children to
think of how they make others feel as a means of training their moral
sensibilities. Indeed, Martin Hoffman claims that this is one of the
most effective ways of socializing your child.1 And those who think
that morality is, in essence, about balancing one’s projects and ends
against those of other people, naturally think that being able to imag-
ine having certain ends is of crucial importance to morality.2 Lastly,
a person’s thoughts and feelings serve as guides to how to interact
with her in ways that enhance her wellbeing, or, at least, are not detri-
mental to it.
There are ways of thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings that
are relatively theoretical or distanced from the subject, and ways that
involve more personal resources, e.g. perspective change. Thus, the
idea that being able to imagine what others think and feel is central
to morality can be fleshed out in two different ways. First, it may be
thought of as simply involving the ability to ascribe thoughts and feel-
ings to others. Second, it might be thought to involve more substan-
tial imaginative abilities, like the ability to put oneself in someone
else’s shoes. There may be other ways of substantiating this claim, but
here I shall only be concerned with the aforementioned ones.
Everybody agrees that our social abilities include the ability to ascribe
representational mental states to others. More colloquially put, it
includes the ability to think of others as having thoughts and feelings
different from one’s own, or that one would have in the same situa-
tion. This ability is more sophisticated than what is found in many
other social animals, i.e. the abilities to see other animate beings as
goal-directed and as subjects of hedonic states, like pain, anger and
fear. Seeing others as animate and subject to hedonic states in this
way is arguably necessary for morality, and for the purposes of this
discussion we can assume that it is.3 The question is what role, if any,
more complex ways of thinking about others plays in morality.
I argue that whereas being able to imagine what others think and
feel plays an important role in being able to live well with others, in
being a kind, considerate, and nice person, it plays a relatively restrict-
ed role in more gross morality, i.e. in preventing us from killing or
harming others, being just towards them, and so on. In what follows,
I capture this distinction as that between gross moral norms and
supererogatory norms. I acknowledge that, as it stands, the distinction
is somewhat crude. It is meant to capture an intuitive distinction
between norms that we are required to uphold (gross moral norms),
and norms the living up to which is more praiseworthy than obliga-
tory (supererogatory norms).
I first consider the idea that being able to imagine how others think
and feel is necessary for good moral functioning, and reject it. In cer-
tain cultures, others’ thoughts and feelings play a relatively minor role
in the justification of harm norms and people with autism, who have
problems thinking about others’ mental states, experience relatively
few problems understanding, and adhering to, central moral norms.
Nevertheless, there is clearly some relation between the ability to imag-
ine others’ thoughts and feelings and morality, and the remainder of
the paper investigates what this relation is. Daniel Batson’s work
demonstrates its effectiveness in helping behavior. But it turns out that
imagining being in someone else’s position is less conducive to help-
fulness than simply thinking of others’ thoughts and feelings.4 Putting
oneself in others’ shoes is not required for, indeed it can be detrimen-
tal to, moral thought or motivation. I suggest that the distinctive role
played by imagining what others’ think and feel is in regulating close
personal and peer relations and in supererogatory helping behavior. In
the case of autism, it becomes clear that imagining what others think
and feel is crucial to good social relations and interactions, but less
so to the ability to understand and be motivated by grosser moral pro-
hibitions and prescriptions. Such imagination does not, it seems, play
a central role in curtailing violence against others, theft, dishonesty,
and so on. Where it may help on occasion, the facts that people who
have imaginative limitations are not known for their gross immorali-
ty (autism), and people with fine imaginative abilities engage in all
manners of immoral actions (psychopaths) indicate that its moral
importance is more circumscribed. Nevertheless, given that perspec-
tive taking is thought to be morally useful ought we to deploy it more
often in morally relevant situations ? I argue that since thinking about
others’ mental states is replete with biases and is surprisingly inaccu-
rate, it is a limited, albeit sometimes effective, approach.
I do not imagine ( !) that I will have said the last word on the sub-
ject in this paper. What I hope to do is to show what imagining what
others think and feel won’t do for us, and provide some direction to
future research on what it will do for us: it is important in the per-
sonal realm where morality, etiquette, and ordinary concern for oth-
ers become hard to distinguish from each another.
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IS THINKING ABOUT OTHERS THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS
NECESSARY FOR MORALITY?
The most forceful way of putting the idea that imagining what oth-
ers think and feel is central to moral competence—by which I mean
understanding of, and motivation by, moral norms—is to maintain
that it is required for it. On the one hand, it gives us an appropriate
depth of understanding of moral norms, and on the other hand, it pro-
vides the required motivation to adhere to them. I do not know whether
anyone actually holds as strong a view as this. The value of exam-
ining it, however, lies not in its rejection per se, but in the details of
what makes it untenable. Seeing why being able to imagine what oth-
ers think and feel is not necessary for moral competence helps us
better appreciate the scope and nature of this ability.
Let us note, at the outset, that if a moral norm makes essential
reference to a subject’s thoughts and feelings, appreciating it and, per-
haps, being motivated by it requires an ability to ascribe such thoughts
and feelings to others. This I do not dispute. However, I am not alone
in suggesting that most harm norms probably do not require knowl-
edge of this kind to be understood.5 Once we do rule out norms that
make essential reference to representational mental states, however, it
is much harder to see why the ability to ascribe thoughts and feel-
ings to others is essential for moral understanding.
First of all, if the ability to think of others’ thoughts and feelings
plays a central role in moral understanding, we should expect justi-
fications of moral norms to make essential reference to such cate-
gories. But whereas such justifications are common, they are also
subject to cultural and sub-cultural variation. Many people maintain
that they are required to act in accordance with morality because of
considerations comparatively independent of how others think and
feel. For instance, they are required to refrain from certain actions
because of God’s commands, the natural order of things, the dhar-
ma, or because we cannot consistently will that anyone in our posi-
tion act that way. If the necessity view were correct, these people
would not merely be wrong about morality, they would fail to have
moral understanding in the first place.6 This, it seems to me, moves
us beyond the psychology of morality into the realm of normative
ethics. And that is the topic of a different discussion.
Someone might object that people’s justifications are mostly post
hoc and, therefore, do not reflect their real appreciation of the wrong-
ness of moral transgressions. True, deep appreciation is what real
moral understanding is really about, and it involves an appropriate
understanding of others as possessing mental states. The proposal,
however, is not supported by the evidence. Young children and peo-
ple with autism have problems thinking about others’ thoughts and
feelings—in terms of representational mental states—but they appear
to have no principled difficulties grasping the essentials of the con-
cepts of right and wrong (good or bad) or being motivated to do what
is right and to avoid doing wrong. If this is right, then neither the
ability to simply ascribe psychological states to others nor the abili-
ty to imagine being in others’ positions are necessary for moral under-
standing or moral motivation. Let me therefore first present the evi-
dence, and then later explain how it counts against these ideas.
I am not the first to point out that the abilities of people with
autism are very relevant to the discussion. It is something that both
Shaun Nichols and Victoria McGeer have stressed before.7 People
with autism8 have significant difficulties thinking about what others
think and feel. As a result, they often engage in behavior that is incon-
siderate of others, which not infrequently leads to social exclusion.
It does not, however, result in gross immoral behavior of the sort we
would expect from someone who does not appreciate morality or fails
to be motivated by it ; there is no increased tendency for instrumen-
tal violence, for lying, cheating, etc. In fact, people with autism are
no more likely to engage in gross immoral behavior than people with-
out clinical disorders.9 They seem capable of appreciating the notions
of wrong and right. Or rather, they certainly have a notion of right
and wrong. Some people argue that this notion is more associated
with ideas of rule following10 or of universal order11 than with the
question of welfare, but, as I have just argued, that should not make
us think that they lack an idea of right and wrong. People with autism
seem to understand that harming or killing others is especially wrong,
but also that there are other, less serious, types of wrongs. For instance,
Temple Grandin talks of ‘sins of the system’, under which smoking
used to fall when she was in school. Sins of the system contrast with
things that are really wrong.12 Grandin professes to not fully under-
stand why sins of the system are wrong, but never questions why
really bad things are wrong. The norms that people with autism appear
to have particular problems with are rules for human interaction that
have more to do with etiquette than with prohibitions on harm, lying,
and so on. Both Temple Grandin and Shaun Barron report great
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improvement in social interactions once they were able to imagine
the situation from someone else’s perspective.13
It may be objected that someone like Temple Grandin now has a
rather sophisticated understanding of others’ thoughts and feelings. I
do not deny that. The important thing to remember, though, is that
even as a child, when she did not possess much psychological under-
standing at all, Grandin did not exhibit the sort of moral incompre-
hension or lack of moral motivation that we would expect were the
hypothesis we are considering true. This gives us reason to doubt that
being able to think about others’ thoughts and feelings is required for
moral understanding or moral motivation. Another piece of evidence
that counts against this necessity claim is that young children do seem
to have an understanding of wrongs before they have a good grasp
of the idea that others might have different thoughts and feelings from
the ones that they, themselves, have.14 All this suggests that thoughts
about others’ thoughts play a more circumscribed role in moral under-
standing and motivation than people tend to think.
It will be observed that the notions of moral understanding and
motivation that I deploy are largely instrumental. Many think of them
differently. Indeed, some deny that considerations that prevent one
from harming others, other than those associated with the person’s
thoughts and feelings, are truly moral. Whereas we may discount
understandings or motivations that are purely self-interested, but that
nevertheless undergird understanding of, and motivation by, moral
norms, being too picky about what counts as moral is problematic.
Some atheists think religious people cannot possibly be moral if their
understanding and motivation is undergirded by thoughts of God’s
will. Respect of God’s will is, in their minds, ultimately contaminat-
ed by (self) interest in salvation. On the other hand, when Humanist
Canada wanted to place the advertisement ‘You can be good without
God’ on public transit busses in Halifax, the transit authority deemed
the add too controversial and turned the society down.15 Similarly,
when a person on Yahoo asked whether it was possible for her, as an
atheist, to do good deeds, many religious people blankly denied it.16
Clearly, there is substantial disagreement about what counts as ‘real-
ly’ moral. It therefore seems wiser to adopt a more instrumental
notion. Motivation that results in adherence to moral norms or the
performance of morally supererogatory actions should be assumed to
be moral as long as it is not purely and narrowly self-interested, and
other things are equal. Similarly, understanding that moral prescrip-
tions are relatively universal, binding, and not subject to change by
a relevant authority, their transgression very serious and punishable,
should count as moral, ceteris paribus.
To conclude, a proposal as strong as the one that maintains that
the ability to think of, or imagine, what others think and feel is nec-
essary for moral competence is untenable. It rules out the possibili-
ty that considerations that do not make central reference to how peo-
ple think or feel can back up moral understanding. This is problem-
atic, to say the least. It also sits uneasily with evidence from autism
and child development. Nevertheless, it is doubtlessly true that this
ability plays some interesting role in moral functioning, if we under-
stand the moral realm broadly. But what role ? Studies on empathy
provide part of the answer, and provide some intriguing results about
the effects of different forms of imagining what others think and feel.
IMAGINING SELF VERSUS IMAGINING OTHERS
It is sometimes supposed that it is the ability to put oneself in
someone else’s shoes that is central to good moral understanding.
Putting oneself in others’ shoes is usually thought to be equivalent to
simulating them. When we simulate someone, we imagine being in
the situation that she finds herself in. This elicits certain thoughts
and feelings, which we subsequently ascribe to her. Ideally, we adjust
for relevant differences between us. In the simplest cases, we may
adjust a visual perspective ; e.g. I note that although I can see that
there is a warbler on that branch, your view of it is obscured by a
pillar. But we can also, in principle at least, imagine how we would
react to a certain situation if we were looking for someone to kill.
This kind of approach is very popular in prime time television shows,
although there is little evidence that it is actually effective in catch-
ing real-life killers.17 With the exception of Robert Gordon —who
proposes that we imagine being others in their situation18—simula-
tionists agree that when you simulate others, you imagine yourself in
their position.19 Simulation, then, is a more-or-less wholesale projec-
tion of a person into the shoes of someone else.
The idea that we simulate others in order to figure out what they
think and feel has enjoyed much popularity for its simplicity and nat-
uralness. The approach is usually contrasted with the theory theory,
which maintains that our ability to ascribe psychological properties
to others should be understood on the model of theoretical knowl-
edge.20 On the backdrop of this, more dispassionate, approach, simula-
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tion theory has captured the imagination of many a theorist, who see
in it elements capable of bridging the gap between thinking about oth-
ers and morally relating to them. Simulating others can make us under-
stand ‘what it is like’ for someone else21 or lead us to feel for others.22
This fits nicely with the commonsense view that moral relating to oth-
ers is predicated on some ability to see things from their perspective,
e.g. to understand what it is like for others to be treated the way we
propose to treat them. This, of course, is either related to, or consti-
tutes, a form of empathy, which is an emotional relating to others that
has been shown to have effects on helping behavior.
Some of the best-known work on helping is that of Daniel Batson.23
If subjects are asked to imagine how someone else would feel when
in need, they are much more likely to report warm and sympathetic
feelings towards the other and to help them if given the opportuni-
ty.24 Many, including myself, have taken this to provide strong sup-
port of the moral effects of simulation.25 In other words, when we
imagine being in someone else’s shoes, we come to empathize with
the person, and this motivates us to assist her. When we are within
the context of the simulation, we feel what we imagine the other is
feeling, albeit probably in an attenuated way. But once we move out-
side the context of the simulation, we readjust our perspective and,
as a result, we come to feel for the other, whose situation we were
simulating.26 But empirical studies give mixed support to the idea.
For instance, it is not clear that imagining how another feels gener-
ally leads to an engagement of one’s own psychological resources.
Batson and colleagues found that asking people to imagine what
they would feel under the same circumstances as someone in need
leads to different results than asking them to imagine what the other
person feels under those circumstances.27 If asked to focus on the
plight of another, a person generally comes to feel a preponderance
of warm, compassionate, and sympathetic feelings for the other. These
feelings correlate with increased helping behavior, and are, therefore,
generally regarded as being altruistic. Those asked to imagine them-
selves being in the position of the other, as opposed to considering
how the other person feels in the situation, experience a mix of sym-
pathetic feelings and more acute, unpleasant distress. Such distress is
felt partly for the other, partly for the self. The latter form of dis-
tress is commonly known as personal distress and is associated with
egoistic motivation. If it is easy to escape the situation that makes
the person feel distressed (e.g. the room with the person in need),
they are much more likely to do so than people who experience warm,
compassionate, and sympathetic feelings as a result of simply think-
ing about the others’ emotions.
It seems plausible that imagining oneself in the situation of some-
one in need provokes more intense feelings of distress because of the
identification with the individual. The resultant mix of distress for
the self and distress for the other lends support to the idea that an
imagine-self instruction encourages simulation—engagement of the
subject’s own psychological resources—of the other’s situation. For
within the context of the simulation we really do feel for ourselves,
counterfactually placed, as we are, in a situation of need. It is only
at the close of the simulation, once we change our perspective again,
that the resultant distress comes to be felt, in part, for the other. It
is plausible that once we have come to feel personal distress (distress
for ourselves in the counterfactual situation), it is hard to stop.
Elsewhere, I have argued that at the end of a simulation, we change
perspective completely.28 This may not be so. The current evidence
suggests that we retain some of the personally felt distress. And to
the extent that personal distress motivates us to escape the situation,
the danger of simulation is that it may cause us to be less respon-
sive to the plight of others than other forms of thinking about oth-
ers (e.g. just thinking about how they feel).29
The evidence that an imagine-other perspective does not engage
the same emotional resources as an imagine-self perspective is of
great import to the simulation approach. Firstly, it suggests that sim-
ulation that leads to, or involves, empathy is not generally deployed
when we think about others’ feelings. For if you ask someone to
imagine how someone else thinks or feels, they do not appear to
engage the more personal emotional resources associated with simu-
lation. This is evidenced by the fact that the emotions she feels, i.e.
warm, sympathetic, tender feelings, are not experienced by the sub-
ject, who most likely feels some form of distress.30 In other words,
the evidence suggests that people do not simulate in response to being
asked to imagine how others would feel, since their resultant emo-
tions are so different from those of the target.31 This contrasts marked-
ly with the imagine-self instructions where people do seem to engage
their personal emotional resources. The implications for the simula-
tion approach are potentially quite wide-ranging. Notice that the pre-
diction that imagining ourselves in others’ shoes (simulating them)
involves our own emotional resources appears to be supported by the
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evidence (the imagine-self perspective). It just so happens that when
we are asked merely to think of others’ feelings, we rarely simulate.
Simulation theorists who believe that simulation merely gives rise to
beliefs about what others think and feel would not find this evidence
convincing, of course. However, if they suppose that simulation under-
girds both the imagine-self and the imagine-other perspective, they
must tell a story about why the subjects’ feelings and motivations dif-
fer so much in the two sorts of situations. And it is likely that telling
such a story convincingly is going to be much harder than simply
giving up on the idea that simulation is as common a way of think-
ing about others, as is often made out to be the case.
Secondly, the evidence suggests that moral relating to others has
less to do with being able to take up their perspective, as in a sim-
ulation, than people tend to think. When asked to imagine how one
would feel in the subject’s position, one comes to experience the sorts
of emotions that one imagines the subject would feel. By contrast,
when asked to consider how the other feels, one comes to feel warm
and sympathetic feelings, which are much less likely to be consonant
with the emotions of the subject in question.32 In imagine-other sce-
narios, it seems, the subject retains a certain distance from the other’s
situation. Interestingly, this gives rise to pure altruistic motivation in
contrast to the imagine-self perspective. Contrary to what is often
thought, then, there is evidence that retaining a certain amount of dis-
tance from the suffering other is more conducive to helping than
imaginatively taking up her perspective. It is simply unclear that the
prototypical altruistic attitudes of sympathy, compassion, and warm-
heartedness are, in any deep way, related to imagining oneself being
in someone else’s position.
This idea of maintaining a certain emotional distance from the suf-
fering subject is worth dwelling on for a moment. Martin Hoffman
has argued that too much empathy is a bad thing ; it leads to what
he calls ‘empathic over-arousal’.33 The idea is that sometimes the
empathic reaction can be so intensely aversive that it leads to prima-
rily personal distress. Nancy Eisenberg, too, maintains that very strong
empathy leads to personal distress.34 This may be due to a person’s
empathy threshold, their emotional adjustment, their ability to help,
or the intensity of the others’ distress. That children whose facial
expressions are the most reactive to seeing others in distress experi-
ence the greatest behavioral problems (opposition, aggression, defi-
ance, etc.),35 that highly empathetic training nurses have difficulties
staying in the same room with seriously ill patients,36 that very car-
ing and empathetic psychotherapists are more likely to suffer ‘vicar-
ious traumatization’ and consequently be unable to help their patients,37
and that people exposed to a child crying vigorously feel a prepon-
derance of personal distress over empathic concern compared to peo-
ple exposed to a child merely fussing or crying, all speak in favor
of the idea that empathizing with distressed others can lead to per-
sonal distress.38 By contrast, people who are less reactive empathical-
ly (but not hypo-reactive) usually experience more empathy and less
personal distress, help those in need more, and are not as likely to
suffer from vicarious traumatization. Lastly, Janet Strayer found that
children who experience more intense emotions than their target when
they empathize are more likely to experience personal distress.39 It
would seem that too much empathy can be a bad thing.
Of course, empathy is one thing and perspective taking another.
However, since certain types of perspective takings lead to exactly
the sort of personal distress that Hoffman and others propose is the
result of empathic over-arousal, there is reason to think that, in effect,
not only is imagining oneself in others’ shoes not the most effective
approach to achieve moral motivation, it can also have more long-
term damaging effects on the individual (vicarious traumatization). It
may, e.g., be inadvisable for people who are rather sensitive to oth-
ers’ distress to imagine being in their shoes. Imagining yourself in
someone else’s position, of course, really does produce significantly
more empathy for the subject than simply imagining their situation
objectively ; just like imagining how the other feels does.40 But the
distress that is also elicited by this perspective taking exercise is about
as strong as the empathy or sympathy towards the subject. And that
distress, in its turn, is going to increase the likelihood of the person
not helping the other in need if it is easy for her to escape.
It should be noted that imagining being in someone else’s posi-
tion sometimes really does stimulate pro-social motivation. Even
where personal distress is high, subjects are quite likely to help the
person in distress if escape from the situation is difficult. Furthermore,
Batson and colleagues found some evidence that imagining being in
someone’s position can promote actions that benefit the other.41 In
Batson’s studies, subjects had to assign tasks to themselves and a
partner.42 In the first study, one task was significantly more attractive
than the other. Subjects were given the opportunity to flip a coin in
order to decide task allocation. This was supposed to make salient to
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them that fairness was at issue. People who were asked to imagine
how they would think and feel in their partner’s position assigned
themselves the desirable task as often as people who were not asked
to adopt any perspective—which is to say, 75% of the time. Coin
flipping had almost no effect. By comparison, people asked to imag-
ine the others’ feelings assigned themselves the desirable task less
than half the time (42%). In the second study, participants were told
that they and another participant were to answer certain questions.
For each correct answer, the subject would receive two raffle tickets,
but the other person would receive nothing. Subjects were then given
the opportunity to change this unequal assignment of rewards. In this
condition, imagining being in the others’ position had a large effect
on reward assignment. A full 83% of participants in this condition
opted for an equal distribution of rewards (each participant gets a raf-
fle ticket) compared to the no-perspective group, only 38% of which
chose this option. So imagining being in someone else’s position
sometimes has pro-social effects, as long as benefits can be shared,
it is not a zero-sum game, and so on.
The above leads me to make two preliminary suggestions concern-
ing the effects of thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings. First,
thinking about how others feel promotes motivation to help them if
they are in need. It is important to note, however, that experimental
situations are much more clear-cut and less subject to the sorts of
biases that I discussed above. They are also situations where people
think of others in need, where that need is not the result of their
actions. Such studies, therefore, give us only a partial picture of the
positive effects of thinking about others’ feelings. After all, if we
think of our enemy’s feelings, we are quite likely to become even
more incensed with him. Experiments with children show that chil-
dren empathize much less with the victims of their own actions, than
the victims of other people’s actions.43 Other studies show that in-
group members empathizing with out-group members is actually coun-
terproductive if they have to actually interact with such individuals
(as opposed to simply making abstract judgments about them).44
Second, imagining being in someone else’s shoes is not the best
approach when it comes to moral motivation. It often leads to per-
sonal distress, which is associated with egoistic motivation, and it
sometimes has no effect at all. It does appear, however, to be a method
that is very much in use.
Thinking about what others in need feel tends to promote actions
that are aimed at helping the other. The need in question, however,
is not usually desperate, i.e. the person will not be killed, irrepara-
bly harmed, etc. In other words, it would be fair to say that the need
in question does not obligate others to help. Helping the person is a
supererogatory act. This does not make helping any less laudable. In
fact, the opposite is true. What is the case, however, is that refusal
to help should not be regarded as immoral. It is worth noting, in this
context, that Batson, himself, warns that altruistic motivation induced
by an imagine-other perspective should not be confused with moral
motivation. Such altruistic motivation can lead to immoral actions,
such as unfair distribution of resources.45 So, thinking about others’
feelings is known to have powerful effects on motivation to benefit
the other. All the situations that we have considered, however, are
plausibly regarded as calling for supererogatory actions. If one task
is undesirable and another desirable, morality does not prescribe that
we should choose the undesirable one for ourselves so that another
can benefit. Fair distribution of rewards, as in the raffle tickets exper-
iment, seems more likely to be associated with a norm prescribing
fairness, but it could certainly be disputed whether it falls under a
solid moral norm. By contrast, harming others is clearly proscribed
by harm norms.
What I am gesturing at is that thinking about others’ thoughts and
feelings is primarily useful in promoting supererogatory acts, not in
promoting adherence to norms prohibiting gross immoral actions, such
as killing, harming, stealing, lying, etc. This idea is supported by data
from autism. When I talked about people with autism, I indicated that
the ability to imagine what others think and feel appears to be very
important when it comes to forging closer social relationships. A lot
of social interaction is guided not so much by a web of unspoken rules
as by a sensitivity to others in executing our actions. We consider how
what we do will affect others, which is part of what make us nice per-
sons. Not doing so may make us unpleasant, but not necessarily
immoral. Or so, at least, I shall argue in the next section.
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FITTING IN
Many people with autism who have managed to become reason-
ably well integrated in society, believe that part of the reason for their
success is their increased ability to think about and understand oth-
ers’ thoughts and feelings. Among other things, they maintain that
thinking more flexibly about others’ motives and internal states allows
them to deal with their anger better. They also find that they are able
to maintain positive relationships with others due to their enhanced
appreciation of folk psychology. It is interesting to observe that the
anger management issues that they have appear to be no different
from those of ordinary people, and the treatment that is effective with
normal people is effective with them too, e.g. cognitive-behavioral
therapy. Similarly, much of the advice that people with autism give
to each other about how people and social relationships work is advice
that ordinary people would find useful. Autism highlights the multi-
farious ways in which thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings
influences ordinary social interactions.
Let us first consider anger management. Many people with autism
are subject to inappropriate and powerful outbursts of anger. Part of
that anger is related to the attitudes that other people have towards
them, frustration at their lack of control, etc. To what extent might
improved ability to imagine what others think and feel help ? Shaun
Barron blames his previous poor social relationships on his need for
control, self-absorption, and lack of understanding of others’ perspec-
tives on things. He claims that:46
People with autism can be so wrapped up in their own thinking
that they fail to see the effect their words and actions have on the
people around them. At times my own need to control my environ-
ment was so strong that whenever the rules I created in my mind
were broken, even in the slightest way, it was an earthquake of gigan-
tic proportions. Autism does not give a person a license for display-
ing poor manners and hurting others’ feelings. (222)
It was being so caught up in trying to preserve some semblance
of order in my life and having little ability to deviate from it. It was
also an inability to see something through someone else’s eyes. When
something or someone violated my house of cards—and it happened
a lot—I became so filled with fury that it consumed me. I couldn’t
apologize under those conditions—there was no room in my think-
ing processes for anything other than the rage. (225)
If people failed to respond the way I expected, I assumed I had
done something wrong or stupid. It never occurred to me that there
were other perspectives than mine, and in fact, many possible, plau-
sible different ways to interpret such an interaction. (255)
Barron maintains that working on trying to understand others, tak-
ing up their perspective, and so on played a large part in his improved
social life and general wellbeing. Both Barron and Grandin recount
countless failed interactions with others as a result of their deficient
understanding. They attribute their successful social interactions to
their acquired psychological knowledge, in particular to taking the
perspective of the other person.
Failures to interact well with others range from serious moral trans-
gression—e.g. physical violence or murder—to faux pas’s. People with
autism do not appear to have particular difficulties across this entire
range. Their problems start somewhere around being profoundly self-
absorbed and a serious nuisance to others—e.g. shouting hysterical-
ly at others and throwing things around if they do not do exactly
what they want them to do—and continues through the finer aspects
of etiquette norms—boring others with a blow-by-blow account of
Freddie Keppard’s biography, e.g.47 Therapists usually assume that the
most serious problem people with autism have is learning how to
behave in a socially appropriate manner—learning etiquette—not
learning how to avoid gross immoral behavior. This fits with most
of the first-person accounts you find in the literature. To be sure,
Grandin was thrown out of school for throwing a book at another
girl, but although we may agree that this is a regrettable event, it
hardly matches the sort of misdemeanors that are commonly observed
among children with conduct disorder, e.g. Violent aggression is not
a characteristic trait of people with autism qua the disorder.48 This is
not to say that people with autism cannot be violent ; they certainly
can. However, psychologists have found no correlation between the
disorder and propensity of violence.49
Self-help books for people with autism tend to focus on etiquette,
and self-consciously so. Here you find advice about the value of
bathing regularly, changing clothes, using deodorant, and so on. But
apart from this rather basic advice, they read like average self-help
books, not instruction manuals for developmentally disordered peo-
ple. From reading the literature on people with autism—including
really high-performing ones—one would expect much more basic
manuals, but Grandin and Barron include advice beneficial to any-
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one but the most socially adept.50 This is sophisticated advice about
how to get on with others in the more fine-grained ways. It concerns
how to deal with personal interactions in small groups, how to forge
social relationships, how to maintain them, and so on.
I go into such detail with people with autism’s understanding
of others—specifically taking up their perspective on things—because
I believe it highlights something important about this way of relat-
ing to others. Most importantly, it has more to do with close and
smooth social contact than with moral behavior of the grosser sort.
This is in line with what we found earlier. It seems that we should
not look to sophisticated social understanding for the wellspring of
serious moral norms. Understanding the importance and bindingness
of such norms and being motivated to adhere to them do not require
any particularly sophisticated understanding of others. However, the
ability to function smoothly with others on an everyday basis does.
And, as we have seen, being helpful and nice to others is also close-
ly related to thinking of them in a certain way, i.e. in terms of rela-
tively sophisticated psychological concepts.
BIASES AND LACK OF ACCURACY
If thinking of what others think and feel when they are in distress
promotes sympathy and/or empathy and helping behavior, it seems
plausible to suggest that we ought to consider others’ thoughts and
feelings more often. It will help us to be (morally) better human beings.
Here, I look at some of the difficulties we experience trying to under-
stand others and argue that this fact raises important issues about how
morally useful thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings actually is.
The first problem is that we turn out to be relatively bad, not at
ascribing psychological states to others, but at ascribing the right kinds
of states to them. In a range of studies meant to measure the accura-
cy of psychological attributions, William Ickes and colleagues found
that people are much less good at it than they assume. On average,
people are correct a mere 22% of the time. Only a small number of
people, in one study as few as 11%, are aware of when they are like-
ly to be accurate, and when not.51 There is a poor correlation between
confidence in one’s accuracy and actual accuracy.52 More relevant for
our purposes is Ickes’ finding that there is no correlation between the
propensity to empathize or sympathize with others and accuracy:53
There was not a single reliable correlation between the perceiver-
s’ scores on any of these components—their propensity to imagine
the perspective of others, feel emotional concern for their plight, iden-
tify with fictional characters, and experience emotional distress when
others suffer—and the perceivers’ empathic accuracy scores.
Although not everyone agrees with Ickes’ research methodology,
his results ought to dampen any great enthusiasm one might have
about the power and importance of thinking about others’ inner lives.
The resulting pessimism should, however, be tempered somewhat by
the finding that friends and dating partners are better at gauging each
others’ thoughts and feelings. People are about twice as accurate with
friends and partners compared to strangers, averaging 36% accura-
cy.54 Another potentially encouraging result—depending on your atti-
tude—is that incentivizing accuracy results in more accuracy, partic-
ularly for men. In one study, Klein & Hodges offered cash incentives
for accuracy and found that accuracy improved.55 In other words, if
you can incentivize accuracy, people get better at getting others’
thoughts and feelings right, although not dramatically so.56
The issue of accuracy is complex. The fact that we tend to be
shockingly inaccurate means that we ought to be very careful indeed
in putting too much stock in what we think others think or feel. But
even if our psychological ascriptions are wrong, they may neverthe-
less lead to good results. Perhaps, if we think that others are more
easily hurt than they actually are, we are prone to treat them with
more consideration. On the flipside, if you are wrong about the other
person, what you think you ought to do may turn out to have very
little to do with assisting her. As experience teaches, we do not sim-
ply err about others’ thoughts and feelings in ways that make us act
kinder or more considerately towards them. Therefore, lack of accu-
racy should make us somewhat wary of the suggestion that psycho-
logical ascription is crucial to moral judgment or moral motivation.
What is more problematic than simple lack of accuracy is that
inaccuracy is sometimes due to motivated reasoning. In brief, we think
things are a certain way because it serves some interest of ours, or
we engage in reasoning that is more or less assured to have us reach
the conclusion we are already partial to. We may ignore evidence,
give excessive attention or credence to evidence that supports our
favored view, and rest satisfied with sloppy reasoning that sidesteps
shortcomings in our arguments.57 Folk psychological ascription and
reasoning is no different. It, too, is subject to a host of so-called bias-
es. For instance, our emotions, psychiatric or mental condition, self-
image, or social context all bias how we think about others’ thoughts
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and feelings.58 Let me note, however, that by ‘bias’ I do not mean to
indicate that they are interruptions to stable processes serving predic-
tive and explanatory functions.
People’s views about emotions differ, yet nobody denies that mis-
taken, sometimes outright silly, beliefs are associated with the emo-
tions. Whereas some people argue that emotions cause the relevant
beliefs,59 others that emotions contain them,60 or that they are the
result of automatic, subconscious judgments,61 all agree that emotions
often lead to, or contain, distorted ideas about others’ attitudes. For
instance, when we are jealous of someone, we tend to think that they
are desirous of someone other than ourselves. For the purposes of
the discussion here, it does not matter whether those thoughts are the
result of our emotions or of subconscious judgments or appraisals.
What matters is that our jealous thoughts are often not justified by
the evidence (using ordinary standards of belief justification).62 The
same is true of many other emotions, e.g. shame, fear, and anger.63
It is quite likely that the reason that emotions sometimes give us a
quite distorted view of the world is that they are ‘personal’. We expe-
rience them when something is (particularly) relevant to our concerns.
Richard Lazarus thought that emotions ultimately are about how the
world affects our wellbeing.64 This helps explain why our emotional
beliefs often concern others’ attitudes towards us: when I am angry
with someone, I tend to think of her as being blameworthy, and when
I am afraid of someone, I tend to think of him as intending or want-
ing to harm me. Notice how egocentric these thoughts are. The world
is understood primarily in terms of how it affects us. This spells trou-
ble for views of morality that lean heavily on our thinking about oth-
ers’ thoughts and feelings. Arguably, we need morality the most when
we pursue some goal, the obtaining of which may be difficult to
square with the pursuits of others. But those are the times, this
research suggests, that we are least likely to think of others’ thoughts
and feelings in an accurate and objective manner. We are more like-
ly to interpret them in a way that dovetails with our pursuits.
Given the close connection between thinking of others in certain
ways and our emotions, it is easy to see how certain pathologies of
emotions can lead to systematic misrepresentations of what others
think. Highly anxious or fearful individuals tend to regard all man-
ners of people and situations as threatening ; aggressive individuals
tend to see others as blameworthy ; and people who are depressed are
prone to think that others have derogating attitudes towards them.65
Indeed, depression is associated with a tendency to feel shame and
with a poor self-image. According to William Swann, people are
strongly motivated to have their self-conceptions confirmed, even
when they are negative.66
There are a couple of other biases that are worth mentioning, i.e.
the false consensus effect, the spotlight effect, the illusion of trans-
parency, and projection. People have a tendency to think that their
own choices, attitudes, and behavior are more representative of the
general population than they actually are, with the result that they
over-attribute to others such preferences, etc. (the false consensus
effect67). They tend to overestimate how salient their actions and
appearances are to others, and consequently they overestimate the
degree and extent to which people have positive or negative assess-
ments of their actions and appearances (the spotlight effect68). Further,
people think their thoughts, wants, and feelings are much more trans-
parent to others than they actually are. In other words, they have a
tendency to think others know much more about them than they actu-
ally do (the illusion of transparency69). Lastly, in projection, the sub-
ject (usually) attributes unwanted psychic states—ideas, desires, or
emotions—to another person. In this way, she disowns some of her
own psychic states, while at the same time retaining some awareness
of them. For instance, someone who fancies someone other than their
romantic partner might come to suspect that their partner fancies
someone else. In other cases, what is projected out undergoes some
transformation.70 Where psychoanalytic projection used to be regard-
ed with some suspicion by social psychologists, there is now increas-
ing evidence of its existence.71 Engaging in a certain degree of pro-
jection is presumably a precondition for good mental health because
it reduces internal conflict. It is important to note, though, that pro-
jection usually creates a false image of others and what they think
of us. And the image need not be benign.
Mere inaccuracies may lead us astray in our thoughts about oth-
ers, creating some problems caring appropriately for them. This may
be a minor problem, however. It pales in the light of the realization
that we often think of others as wanting, thinking, and feeling things
because thinking of them that way serves some, not necessarily con-
scious, interests of ours. The interests that I have enumerated, i.e.
evaluating someone’s effects on our wellbeing, self-confirmation, self-
stability, and so on, are not moral in any interesting sense. Indeed,
they are very much self-interests. If self-interested biases operate even
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at the level of our thoughts about others’ thoughts and feelings, this
creates problems for the role of such thoughts in moral action. After
all, either it serves our interests to reciprocate, etc., or it does not.
In the former case, ordinary prudential reasoning and motivation will
do, and in the latter, we would need some reason to overcome our
more egoistic motivation. But if thinking about others’ thoughts and
feelings is already biased by our self-interest, it is less useful to do
so than it is often thought.
Nevertheless, Batson-type experiments demonstrate that it is use-
ful, in many circumstances, to think of others’ thoughts and feelings.
Nevertheless, the approach is vulnerable to biases and influences that
may lead us astray because we are prone to understand others in a
way that fits our (self) interests. The worry is that thinking about oth-
ers’ thoughts and feelings is going to be the most effective when
doing so does not conflict with other, important, interests, or when
doing so fits our interests. In the famous Good Samaritan experi-
ment,72the vast majority of subjects that were made to believe that
they were late for a presentation failed to stop to check on a person
slumped in a doorway, appearing to be in serious distress. About half
of those people reported not having noticed anything about the situ-
ation that required intervention. They noticed the person, but ‘failed’
to notice his distress (quite a feat apparently). This experiment may
not be representative of the vast number of morally significant situ-
ations that we find ourselves in, but it highlights the extent to which
extraneous factors affect the way we conceive of others’ emotional
states. This fact puts a rather definite limit to the usefulness of the
approach, and indicates that moral competence is rather complex. Of
course, what I have said here does not challenge the idea that our
moral competence is, as a matter of empirical fact, linked with our
ability to ascribe psychological states to others.
CONCLUSION
It is tempting to think that our moral attitudes towards others will
markedly improve once we consider their thoughts and feelings in
more detail, once we take up their perspective, etc. The conclusion
that I am left with, having examined the proposal in a variety of
forms, is that thinking about what others think and feel improves our
ability to interact with them, but it does so in a less gross way than
is often assumed to be true. It improves our motivation to help oth-
ers in need. This is certainly a great benefit, but it should be noted
that most of the experimental evidence concerns supererogatory, not
morally required, helping. Thinking about others’ thoughts and feel-
ing, particularly in the context of taking up their perspective, also
appears to be useful for knowing what sorts of actions to perform
and which ones to refrain from if one wants to establish, improve
upon, or maintain social relationships with others. It is, however, not
required for, nor need its use substantially improve, the ability to
refrain from unleashing violence upon them, stealing from them, and
so on. This is supported by evidence from people with autism, whose
social relations improve with increased perspective taking and abili-
ty to think about others’ thoughts and feelings.
Now, I have been rather helping myself to the notion of moral
supererogation, and some people will no doubt dislike what I have
been saying. Opinions diverge significantly about what aid we owe—
i.e. we are required to give—others, and what aid is laudable, but
optional. By and large, the experimental data concerns situations in
which people are not in dire or immediate need. The classical Batson
scenario involves helping a young woman care for her younger sib-
lings by running errands, etc., lest they should be put up for adop-
tion. It does not involve saving a drowning child, helping someone
up who has fallen over, etc. The young woman is clearly in need, but
it is doubtful that others are obligated to help her. Whatever your
favored position about moral obligations—some favor very few, oth-
ers very many—you can presumably agree that there are rather large
differences between the prohibition on murder, the injunction or rec-
ommendation to help a person in (not desperate) need, and the pre-
scription that one should not speak out of turn. I tend to think of the
actions as, respectively: morally prohibited, morally supererogatory,
and socially inadvisable. However you want to classify them, there
are clearly important differences between them. And what is striking,
I think, is that whereas we have evidence that thinking about other-
s’ thoughts and feelings plays an important role in supererogatory
actions and socially appropriate action, there is little evidence for it
playing a central role in morally prohibited actions.73 Yet, grand claims
are often made that the ability to think about others’ thoughts and
feelings and/or the ability to take up others’ perspective are central
to good moral functioning generally. As I have been at pains to argue,
it is in the finer details, the niceties, the little considerations, etc. that
the use of perspective taking really comes into its own. It is what
makes life with others easier, smoother, and more pleasant.
L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ’ É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0
45
From a normative perspective, there are additional concerns about
relying too much on imagining what others think and feel. A good
number of biases affect our ability to accurately ascribe psychologi-
cal properties to others. Some are more insidious to the extent that
they are self-interested distortions of others. So whereas imagining
others’ thoughts and feelings certainly has morally beneficial effects,
it is in many cases a less effective approach than is often thought.
It is interesting that religious and moral injunctions to treat oth-
ers as we would like them to treat us, or at least not to treat them
in ways that we would not want them to treat us, are often thought
to support the idea that being able to imagine oneself in another’s
position is essential to morality.74 However, an equally, if not more,
plausible interpretation is that reciprocity lies at the core of morali-
ty. Unless your orientation towards others is one of reciprocity, you
can think all you want about others’ thoughts and feelings, but it
won’t help you fully grasp, and be motivated by, central moral norms.
This, at any rate, is a suggestion worth pursuing.
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59 Maibom 2008.
60 Frijda & Mesquita 2000.
61 Solomon 2003.
62 Cf. Maibom 2008.
63 I have developed these ideas in more detail in Maibom 2008.
64 Lazarus 1991.
65 American Psychiatric Association 2000, Tangney & Dearing 2002, Walker 1984.
66 William Swann 1990.
67 Ross et al. 1977, Kunda 1999.
68 Gilovich & Savitsky 1999.
69 Gilovich et al. 2000.
70 Freud 1911.
71 Kawada et al. 2004, Schimel et al. 2003.
72 Darley & Batson 1973.
73 There is rather mixed evidence about the effect of dispositional empathy on
aggression. Some studies show no effect (e.g. Jolliffe & Farrington 2004), some
show some effects (e.g. Miller & Eisenberg 1988)
74 For instance Confucius said: “do not do to others what you do not want them
to do to you” (Analects 15: 23) and Jesus that “therefore all things whatsoev-
er ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the
law and the prophets” (Matthew 7: 12).
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